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Abstract
Tversky and Kahneman introduced the term framing for the finding that people give different answers to the same question 
depending on the way it is posed. One form of framing involves presenting the same outcome as either a gain or a loss. An 
experiment on starlings by Marsh and Kacelnik suggests that this form of framing occurs in non-humans. We argue that the 
experimental result demonstrates framing in the general sense of context dependence but does not provide compelling evi-
dence of framing in terms of gains and losses. A version of scalar utility theory which is extended to include the possibility 
of memory errors accounts for the data and suggests future lines of research.
Keywords Framing · Scalar utility theory
Introduction
It is well established that the way in which a problem is 
worded influences the answer that people give, see Kahne-
man and Tversky (1984), Tversky and Kahneman (1981, 
1986), Levin et al. (1998). Tversky and Kahneman introduce 
the term “framing” as a name for this effect (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1981). A defining feature of a framing experi-
ment is that the choices available to an animal, and their 
consequences, do not change but behaviour does (Tversky 
and Kahneman 1981; Kühberger 1998). Although framing is 
often discussed in relation to prospect theory (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1981; Kühberger et al. 1999; Schneider 1992; 
Mishra et al. 2012; Ganegoda and Folger 2015), it is defined 
in terms of behaviour and could be brought about by vari-
ous mechanisms (e.g. Tombu and Mandel 2015; Marsh and 
Kacelnik 2002; Schneider 1992; Kühberger 1997).
Given the widespread interest in evaluating whether the 
cognitive abilities of humans and non-humans are similar, 
see Ludvig et al. (2014), Penn et al. (2008), Premack (2007), 
Shettleworth (2012); Santos and Rosati (2015), the exist-
ence of framing in non-humans has been investigated. Some 
framing experiments on humans involve describing the same 
outcome as either a gain or a loss (e.g. Kahneman and Tver-
sky 1984; Tversky and Kahneman 1981, 1986; Levin et al. 
1998; Kühberger 1998; Kühberger et al. 1999; Schneider 
1992; Mishra et al. 2012). Marsh and Kacelnik describe an 
experiment on starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) that they consider 
to provide an example of this form of framing (Marsh and 
Kacelnik 2002). Each of 14 starlings was presented with a 
panel with 3 circular keys. After ten pecks on the central 
key, both of the side keys were illuminated. In choice trials, 
the left and right keys were illuminated with different sym-
bols. Each symbol was associated with a particular outcome. 
If the starling pecked the key with one symbol, it always 
obtained four pellets of food. If it pecked the key with the 
other symbol, it obtained either two pellets or six pellets of 
food with equal probability. Thus, each option gave the same 
mean amount of food, but one was constant (fixed) and the 
other was variable. In standard trials, the left and right keys 
were illuminated with the same symbol. There were two 
treatments. In one (the “gains treatment”), both options gave 
one pellet, whereas in the other (the “losses treatment”), 
both options gave seven pellets. During tests, 25 % of trials 
were choice trials. The argument of Marsh and Kacelnik is 
that the standard trials frame the outcomes of choice trials. 
In the “gains treatment”, the mean amount on choice trials 
is greater than the amount obtained on standard trials and in 
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the “losses treatment”, the mean amount on choice trials is 
less than the amount obtained on standard trials. From this, 
Marsh and Kacelnik argue that the outcomes are framed as 
gains in the former treatment and losses in the latter. Such 
a claim goes beyond the effect of treatment to argue for a 
particular way in which the effect occurs. Our view is that 
although the effect of treatment demonstrates framing, the 
results can be explained without assuming that the outcomes 
are framed as gains or losses.
Marsh and Kacelnik discuss three approaches to explain-
ing which option is chosen. Risk-sensitive foraging theory 
(e.g. McNamara and Houston 1992) is based on linking food 
to evolutionary success. If the value of food shows dimin-
ishing returns, then the constant option should be preferred. 
Prospect theory (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky 1979) also 
involves a function that scales outcomes, but the function 
is different for gains and losses and results in preferring 
constant gains and variable losses. Although both prospect 
theory and risk-sensitive foraging theory involve rescaling 
outcomes, they are fundamentally different in that unlike 
risk-sensitive foraging theory, prospect theory produces vio-
lations of rationality (Houston et al. 2014). The approach 
that Marsh and Kacelnik concentrate on is scalar utility 
theory (SUT) (see e.g. Kacelnik and Brito e Abreu 1998; 
Kacelnik and El Mouden 2013; Rosenström et al. 2016). 
Instead of being based on assigning value to outcomes, SUT 
is based on how they are perceived. We now summarise the 
way in which Marsh and Kacelnik use SUT to predict the 
results of their experiment.
At the heart of SUT is the idea that an animal does not 
perceive its environment accurately. Instead it makes sys-
tematic errors, in that the standard deviation of the error 
of each perceived variable is proportional to its mean (this 
is the scalar property), so that the coefficient of variation 
is constant. This scalar property of the theory is based on 
Ernst Heinrich Weber’s concept of a “just noticeable differ-
ence”. Approaches based on the scalar property have been 
used in the study of spatial and temporal behaviour (e.g. 
Gibbon 1977; Cheng 1992; Cheng et al. 1999; Kacelnik 
and Brunner 2002; Lejeune and Wearden 2006). For a gen-
eral review, see Akre and Johnsen (2014). In the model of 
Marsh and Kacelnik, the coefficient of variation is the only 
parameter. The animal builds up an internal representation 
of each option based on its perception of the consequences 
of choosing the option (e.g. the amount of food obtained). 
When it is faced with a choice between options, the animal 
draws a sample from memory for each option. If the ani-
mal is trying to select the option that provides the largest 
amount of food, it will choose the option with the biggest 
sample. Reboreda and Kacelnik presented starlings with a 
choice between a fixed option and a variable option with 
two equiprobable outcomes having the same mean as the 
fixed option (Reboreda and Kacelnik 1991). Under these 
conditions, SUT predicts a preference for the fixed option, 
i.e. risk aversion. This effect does not depend on drawing a 
single sample (Kacelnik and Brito e Abreu 1998). Marsh and 
Kacelnik apply SUT to their experiment by claiming that the 
above argument applies to the “gains treatment”, whereas in 
the “losses treatment”, a starling will want to minimise its 
loss and hence select the option with the smaller sample. In 
other words, the starlings are predicted to be risk-averse in 
the gains treatment and risk-prone in the losses treatment. 
Marsh and Kacelnik found that in the gains treatment, 8 out 
of 14 starlings preferred the fixed option [not significant], 
whereas in the losses treatment 12 of 14 preferred the vari-
able option [significant], i.e. the SUT prediction was sup-
ported in the “losses treatment”.
We are not convinced by the attempt of Marsh and 
Kacelnik to explain their data in terms of a version of SUT. 
As they point out [p 3354], in both treatments, the choice 
outcomes yield a gain in absolute terms. Starlings should 
choose the option associated with the most food in each 
treatment, and hence risk-prone behaviour should not be 
found. We argue that the effect of treatment can be predicted 
from a version of SUT that includes the possibility of errors 
in memory.
In the following, we introduce the new mathematical 
model based on SUT, extended by a parameter quantifying 
the errors in memory. We present simulated data for various 
values of this memory parameter and compare our results 
to the experimental findings by Marsh and Kacelnik. The 
new model predicts the behaviour qualitatively, and even 
quantitatively to a small degree.
Model
According to SUT, an alternative with a fixed outcome 
forms an internal representation of a normal distribution 
with a mean 휇 equal to the actual outcome. If an alternative 
has a set of different outcomes, the internal representation 
takes the form of a mixture of normal distributions with 
means equal to the respective outcomes and weighted by 
their respective probabilities. Furthermore, the standard 
deviation of these distributions increases linearly with the 
mean, 휎 = 훾휇 . The proportionality constant 훾 is the coef-
ficient of variation. Thus, memories of larger outcomes are 
subject to a larger error than memories of smaller outcomes.
We represent an option with outcome a by a normal dis-
tribution Na with mean 휇 = a and standard deviation 휎 = 훾a . 
The probability of an option with outcome a being judged pref-
erable to an option with outcome b is then equal to the prob-
ability Pr(ma > mb) of a sample ma from distribution Na being 
bigger than a sample mb from distribution Nb . This probability 
363Animal Cognition (2020) 23:361–366 
1 3
is equal to the cumulative of the normal distribution Nb−a with 
mean 휇 = b − a and standard deviation 휎 =
√
(훾a)2 + (훾b)2,
Before we introduce a version of SUT extended by an error 
in memory, let us consider a trial with one variable option SV 
with outcomes a or b, and a fixed option SF with outcome f. 
The outcomes a and b of the variable option have probabil-
ity pa and pb = 1 − pa , respectively. According to SUT, the 
animal, faced with the choice between a fixed and a variable 
option, retrieves a sample mf  from its cognitive representa-
tion of SF—the normal distribution Nf—and compares it to 
a memory sample mv of the cognitive representation of the 
variable alternative SV . With probability pa , the memory 
sample mv of SV will be taken from distribution Na and with 
probability pb it will be taken from Nb . Hence, the probabil-
ity that the fixed outcome is judged preferable to the variable 
outcome depends on which memory is recalled. This prob-
ability is now a weighted sum of the probability of mf  being 
judged preferable to ma (which is the cumulative probability 
휙a−f  ) and the probability of mf  being judged preferable to mb 
(which is the cumulative probability 휙b−f  ). We can write the 
probability of the fixed alternative (with outcome f) being 
judged preferable to the variable alternative using the cumu-
lative distribution, as a weighted sum:
We now turn to the experimental setup of choice and stand-
ard trials with starlings used by Marsh and Kacelnik (2002). 
The settings of the choice and the standard trials are identi-
cal and only differ in the symbols on the choice keys. This 
leads us to propose that the animals do not perfectly dis-
tinguish the “framing” standard trial from the choice trial. 
Rather, we suggest that in their confusion the starlings make 
decisions based on a mixed memory of both.
To reflect such a confusion mathematically, we extend SUT 
by a memory parameter, 휃 . This parameter weighs the influ-
ence of the memory of the standard trial on the decision in the 
choice trial. In other words, 휃 accounts for the extent of the 
confusion. An animal, faced with a choice between a fixed and 
a variable option, draws a sample from memory as described 
above. With probability 휃 , however, it retrieves a sample from 
the wrong memory, that is in this case the memory of the 
standard trial. We now modify Eqs. 1 and 2 to account for 
this confusion. Beginning with Eq. 1, we obtain the following 
generalised expression for the probability of some fixed option 
with outcome a being judged preferable to some other fixed 
option with outcome b:




(2)Pr(mf > mv) = pa𝛷a−f + pb𝛷b−f .
(3)




+ (1 − 𝜃)2𝛷b−a ,
where we denote the outcome of the standard option with ‘s’. 
Here, 휙s−s is the (trivial) case of Eq. 1 for two equal options 
a = b , which yields, by definition, 휙s−s = 1∕2 . With prob-
ability 휃 either a or b is confused with the standard option 
and with probability 휃2 both are confused with the standard 
option. Thus, for 휃 = 0 , the memory of the standard trial is 
never sampled and we recover Eq. 1. For 휃 = 1 , the memory 
of the standard trial is exclusively sampled and none of the 
options of the current trial are actually considered. As a 
result, the probability that outcome a is preferred over out-
come b is 1/2, independent of the values of a and b.
Next, we generalise the expression for the probability 
of preference with one option being variable (Eq. 2). For a 
choice trial with one fixed option (outcome f) and one vari-
able option (outcomes a or b) and a standard trial (outcome 
s), Eq. 2 becomes:
Note that the model described here has two parameters 
only, the memory parameter 휃 and the coefficient of vari-
ation 훾 = 휎∕휇 . In the next section, we present predictions 
from Eq. 4 for various values of 휃 and 훾 and compare the 
results to the experimental findings on starlings by Marsh 
and Kacelnik.
Results
Figure 1 shows Pr(mf > mv|𝜃) (Eq. 4) for a range of 훾 val-
ues and a set of values for the memory parameter 휃 . Values 
for means and probabilities are as in Marsh and Kacelnik 
(2002) , i.e. a = 2, b = 6, f = 4 , s = 1, 7 , respectively, and 
pa = 0.5 = pb.
For 휃 = 0 , we recover the SUT prediction (uppermost curve 
in Fig. 1) of risk-averse behaviour (preference for the fixed 
option) for all values of 훾 . This prediction does not change with 
a non-zero memory parameter ( 𝜃 > 0 ) in the gains treatment 
( s = 1 ): our model predicts risk-averse behaviour for all values 
of 훾 . This is qualitatively similar to the SUT prediction, albeit 
with risk averseness getting weaker with increasing values of 
휃 , tending towards indifference for 휃 = 1 when only the stand-
ard option is compared to itself. In the loss treatment with 
non-zero 휃 , on the other hand, we observe both risk-prone and 
risk-averse behaviour depending on the range of 훾 values. The 
values of 훾 yielding risk-prone behaviour lie between 0.1 and 
0.6, with the upper limit on 훾 increasing from 0.25 for small 휃 
(0.3) to 0.6 for large 휃 (0.9). This prediction deviates from the 
SUT prediction but reproduces qualitatively the experimental 
findings. For comparison, the experimentally observed mean 
(4)
Pr(mf > mv|𝜃) = 𝜃2𝛷s−s
+ 𝜃(1 − 𝜃)
[
𝛷s−f + pa𝛷a−s + pb𝛷b−s
]
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values for the probability of choosing the fixed option is ≈ 0.51 
in the gains treatment vs. ≈ 0.40 in the loss treatment (esti-
mated from Fig.1 in Marsh and Kacelnik (2002)). Note that 
the observed magnitude of risk-prone behaviour in the loss 
treatment is greater than that produced by our model.
As can be seen from Fig. 1, we are unable to replicate 
the observed results unless 훾 is about 0.2. This value is out-
side the range of 0.3–0.8 reported by Kacelnik and Brito e 
Abreu Kacelnik and Brito e Abreu (1998). It is, however, 
compatible with data on starlings. To see this, in Fig. 2 we 
show predictions of SUT for the probability of choosing the 
fixed option. We set parameter values of means and prob-
abilities to those used in three different experiments [val-
ues given in Reboreda and Kacelnik (1991); Bateson and 
Kacelnik (1995) and estimated from Fig. 3 in Brito e Abreu 
and Kacelnik (1999)]. The figure includes the data of the 
experimental results. For 훾 = 0.2 , SUT gives a reasonable 
agreement with the data and for the two lower curves in 
Fig. 2 (Reboreda and Kacelnik 1991, Bateson and Kacelnik 
1995); increasing 훾 to 0.3 or higher brings no improvement. 
In these cases, the SUT prediction for risk averseness is not 
particularly sensitive to 훾 between 0.2 and 0.8.
Discussion
Although it is difficult to give a rigorous definition of 
framing, the central idea is that it involves presenting 
essentially the same problem in different ways. This is 
relatively easy to do in experiments on humans; language 
allows different descriptions of the same problem. Work 
on non-humans has to find other ways of framing, e.g. 
Bhatti et al. (2014); Krupenye et al. (2015); Lakshminaray-
anan et al. (2011). The study by Marsh and Kacelnik is 
viewed as a clear example of an experiment on non-human 
subjects in which the same options are presented as either 
gains or losses (Krupenye et al. (2015), Kanngiesser and 
Woike (2016), Krupenye et al. (2016). Although Marsh 
and Kacelnik establish framing in the general sense that 
behaviour changes despite the fact that the choice options 
remain the same, our suggestion is that the value of stand-
ard trials changes the context of choice because the deci-
sion maker cannot keep the standard trials and the choice 
trials distinct. Thus, we see the results as illustrating con-
text dependence rather than the more stringent condition 
of framing in terms of gains and losses, and note that the 
experimental procedure has similarities to that of Ludvig 
et al. (2014). Furthermore, our interpretation makes the 
procedure analogous to experiments which investigate how 
the relative preference between two options depends on 
the presence of a third option, e.g. Bateson and Kacelnik 
(1995), Royle et al. (2008), Monteiro et al. (2013), Lea and 
Ryan (2015). The fundamental difference is that in these 
experiments the added option is present in the world and 
can be chosen, whereas in our interpretation the added 
option is present only in the animal’s memory. These two 
cases correspond to what Louie et al. (2015) call spatial 
context and temporal context, respectively.




























Fig. 1  Predictions of the memory model (Eq.  4). Param-
eters are chosen as in Marsh and Kacelnik (2002), i.e. 
a = 2, b = 6, f = 4, pa = 0.5, s = 1 (gains) and s = 7 (losses), for 
various values of 휃 . The dashed black line is the SUT prediction, i.e. 
휃 = 0 (colour online)
























Fig. 2  Predictions of SUT (Eq.  2) for the parameter values used in 
three choice experiments with starlings (Reboreda and Kacelnik 
1991; Bateson and Kacelnik 1995; Brito e Abreu and Kacelnik 1999) 
(see text). The values of the experimental observations are shown as 
straight lines (colour online)
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Conclusion
We conclude that the experimental findings on starlings 
by Marsh and Kacelnik can be explained with a version 
of SUT which is extended to include the possibility of 
memory errors. To our mind, this is a more consistent 
explanation than the concept of framing in terms of gains 
and losses offers. Our approach makes quantitative predic-
tions that can be checked by estimating 훾 . If we assume 
that decreasing the number of standard trials or making the 
symbols on the choice keys less similar decreases 휃 , then 
we can also make qualitative predictions. Regardless of 
the quantitative predictions of our model, it is noteworthy 
that we are able to produce qualitative trends that resemble 
framing in terms of gains and losses.
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